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A S THE United States and Russia edge closer to the Moon, the question
of national control of the Moon and planets looms larger in the port-
hole of international law. The topic has been treated extensively by many
writers and has been considered in general terms by the United Nations.
In most instances the discussion has been limited to the application of state
sovereignty on planetary bodies.'
The well-known United Nations Assembly Resolutions 1721 (XVI)
and 1962 (XVIII) express the unanimous view of the delegates that:
(1) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations,
applies to outer space and celestial bodies.
(2) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by
all states on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.
(3) Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropria-
tion by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.
These General Assembly Resolutions have advanced only to the perimeter
of legal matters that may assume significance in respect to control of
celestial areas.
In the near future it is unlikely that any nation will claim sovereignty
of an entire celestial body, such as the Moon, at the risk of inviting the
ridicule of the world. Nor, in view of the Assembly Resolutions, is it
probable that any nation will symbolically annex a disproportionately
large sector of any such body. It is submitted, rather, that the real point
of issue will be the character and degree of control of specific areas of
celestial bodies.
The chief thrust toward interplanetary exploration thus far has been
spearheaded by the United States and Russia, on a national basis. This is
borne out in the separate draft treaties submitted to the United Nations
this June by the United States and Soviet Russia.! Though both drafts re-
nounce "national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use
t B.A., Montclair State Teachers' College; LL.B., New York University; LL.M., New York
University Law Center; Member of the International Institute of Space Law.
'New approaches have been unearthed by Schachter, Who Owns the Universe, in AcRoss THE
SPACE FRONTIER 118 (Ryan ed. 1952); HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 118 (1963);
McDoUGAL, VLASIC & LASSWELL, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 819-71 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as McDOUGAL]; Fasan, Law and Peace for the Celestial Bodies, in PROCEEDINGS, FIFTH COL-
OQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (International Institute of Space Law 1962). [hereinafter
the various annual proceedings are cited as COLLOQUIUM].
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or occupation, or by other means," neither draft characterizes in an
affirmative way the legal status of celestial terrain. The United States pro-
posal yields to states exclusive authority over their facilities and personnel
on celestial bodies, as well as retention of ownership of objects placed
there, and the Russian draft has the same effect."
The Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee for the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, meeting in Geneva, may recommend an
agreed draft treaty for General Assembly approval this September. Any
such -draft is likely to confirm to the nations full overlordship of their
planetary installations and artifacts while purporting to disaffirm "sov-
ereignty" and "national appropriation."
Along these lines, the recent announcement by President Johnson
authorizing the United States Air Force to develop a manned orbiting
laboratory (MOL) for essential military purposes' coupled with reports of
parallel Russian plans' is, although understandable in the name of security,
a retrograde-but not a fatal step-in the direction of the nationalization
of space. Unless this unilateral state of facts is modified, it will have cer-
tain practical consequences. Under the law of conservation of political
structures, legal and policy models have an inertial stubbornness in that
they tend to keep the same shape in which they were first formed.7
The issue may not be of critical urgency. Time, competing claims on
national resources, and national crises here on earth will postpone the time
for decision. Other than for reasons of prestige, there is no indication of
an immediate competitive confrontation on the planets over minerals as
occurred in Africa. The cost of space travel is too great, and it may be
less expensive to search and mine raw materials from the ocean.' Thus,
there is not likely to be the "gold rush syndrome" envisioned by Dr.
Schachter.!
What is of greater significance in the intermediate future is whether
space exploration will finally proceed on an international basis or whether
it will continue exclusively on a national level. This long-range political
question is interlaced with legal questions, and both the legal and political
aspects will influence one another. For the sake of clarity, it is proposed
3Article 7 reads: "A State may exercise authority over its facilities and persons participating
in its activities on a celestial body. Ownership of objects shall not be affected by their being landed,
constructed or used on a celestial body." Article 6 grants a right of access to all areas of celestial
bodies at any time to "representatives of other states" conducting activities there.
4 Article V states in part: "A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched
into outer space is carried, shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object and over any per-
sonnel thereon, while it is in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched
into outer space including objects delivered to or constructed on a celestial body and of their com-
ponent parts, shall not be affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by
their return to earth." The Soviet draft also provides for free access to all regions of celestial bodies.
5 N.Y. Times, 26 Aug. 1965, p. 1, col. 8.
" N.Y. Herald Tribune, 26 Aug. 1965, p. 1, col. 3 (late city ed.).
' See, e.g., the retention of the Cuban invasion plans by the incoming Kennedy Administration,
which in the words of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. showed "how contingency planning could gen-
erate its own momentum and create its own reality." Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, Life, 23 July
1965, p. 65.
8KOPAL, THE MOON 133-34 (2d ed. 1964).
'Schachter, supra note 1, at 118.
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to separate the legal questions from the political questions and deal with
the is and the ought separately.'*
II. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
A. National Sovereignty Of The Planets
The issue of control of the Moon, Mars, or other planets is most often
approached in an effort to determine whether celestial territory is res nullius
or res communis. The United Nations has accepted the latter which is a
significant advance over past norms of international law. However, both
res nullius and res communis permit a rule of exclusivity over a lunar
sector, thus avoiding the questions of national as opposed to international
control and the allocation of the burdens and benefits from planetary
exploration." There exists an embryonic conflict inherent in the principle
of free use of celestial bodies. M. Deleau, the French delegate to the Legal
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, stated the contradiction precisely at Geneva last year: "How
was the exploitation by one State of part of a celestial body to be har-
monized with the principle that celestial bodies were free for use by all
states?"" Certain responsive declarations by national spokesmen indicate
national solutions. We are told by the Judge Advocate of the Air Force
that Resolution 1721 (XVI) "is of course not intended to preclude the
establishment by exploring states of settlements upon such land masses.""
Attorney General Katzenbach, while postulating the possibility of joint or
partnership interests in celestial facilities on planets, speaks of "a new
hybrid principle" that is not sovereignty but "primary rights of a national
in a localized facility created by its own efforts."14
It is difficult to see how "primary rights" would differ from sovereignty
except in name, but both would be justified under present international
law. This conclusion is reached by the following process: International
law reaches to the planets because there is no spatial limitation in inter-
national law, and absent a prohibitory rule, states are free to act as they
please."' The conduct of nations reinforces this conclusion. International
law has in fact been unequivocally applied to space in the Moscow Test
Ban Treaty of 5 August 1963 signed by one hundred nations."
"
0 AUsTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1954).
" HALEY Op. cit. supra note 1, at 138. See, Status of Competing Claims, in PROCEEDINGS,
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (1963) (comment of Dr. Howard J. Tauben-
feld): "[Resolution 17211 does not provide an alternative regime to national claims.
'
2 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.10/C.2/SR.29-37, p. 47 (1964).
IaMenter, Formulation of Space Law, in SIXTH COLLOQUIUM (1963).
14 Katzenbach, The Law in Outer Space, in SPACE: ITS IMPACT ON MAN AND SOCIETY 78 (Levy
ed. 1965).
"' Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (1927): "International Law governs
the relations between independent states." See MacMahon, Legal Aspects of Outer Space, BRIT.
YB. INT'L L. 357 (1962): "[L]ogically, there is no inherent reason why such principles should
be earthbound and should not reach out after and govern state activities wherever they take place."
"Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
5 Aug. 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 5433:
Article 1. Each of the parties to this Treaty undertake to prohibit, to prevent,
and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear ex-
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In order to apply international law to the planets, it is necessary to look
to treaties and international custom as principle sources of law.1" There are
no treaties in force governing the situation. The closest analogies are the
cited United Nations Resolutions 1721 (XVI) and 1962 (XVIII). They
deal with sovereignty in general terms and, strictly speaking, forbid state
subjection only of an entire celestial body, not a portion thereof. A more
serious deficiency established by the weight of authority is that, in the
absence of an international instrument or convention, General Assembly
Resolutions, even those unanimously passed, which do not involve the
specific responsibilities of that body, are not legally binding on states.
They do have, however, great moral force."
We look next to the practice of states. Both Russia and the United States
have made remote physical contact with the Moon by satellite and have
mapped its surface. Russia's Lunik II hit the lunar orb in 1959, thought-
fully scattering pentagonal medallions stamped with the Soviet coat of
arms and a Russian flag." These activities do not provide a sufficient
basis for claim of ownership under the doctrine of effective occupation."m
Even were they juridically adequate, they were accompanied by denials of
claim of sovereignty. As a result the indispensible "intention and will to
act as sovereign" is absent, and this absence is fatal to any later claim
based on these activities."'
What acts would be legally sufficient for a claim of sovereignty on the
plosion, at any place under its jurisdiction and control: (a) In the atmosphere;
beyond its limits including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters
or high seas ...
The United Nations has, of course, assumed the applicability of international law to space, not
only in Resolutions 1721 (XVI) and 1962 (XVIII), but also in a third Resolution, 1884 (XVIII),
which calls on all states to refrain from "installing such (nuclear) weapons on celestial bodies or
stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner."
17 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST., art. 38.
1 See generally Asamoah, The Legal Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly, 3 COLUM.
J. TRANS-NAT'L L. 210 (1965); Csafabi, The U.N. General Assembly Resolutions on Outer Space
as Sources of Space Law, in EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM 337-61 (1965); Johnson, Effect of Resolutions
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 97 (1955-1956); Sloane, The
Binding Force of a Recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations, BRIT. YB.
INT'L L. 1 (1948). For the particular effect of Resolutions 1721 (XVI) and 1962 (XVIII), see
Herczeg, The Legal Character of UNO Resolutions, in SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM 273 (1964); Hig-
gins, The Development of International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations, PRO-
CEEDINGs, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (1965). For Russia's position see the
pertinent statements of Delegate Ambrosini (Italy), Deleau (France), and Glaser (Romania) in
U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.29-37, p. 44; and U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/PV.25-35, p. 15
(1964). The United States takes the minority view that the Resolutions presently "state the law
as it is accepted by members of the United Nations." Letter from the State Department to this
writer, 15 June 1965; see statement of Secretary of State Rusk, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 315, 318
(1962); statement of former Ambassador to the United Nations Stevenson, U.N. Doc. No.
A/C.I/PV.1342, p. 6-46 (1963); 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1005 (1963); and 51 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 755 (1964).
"' Finch, Territorial Claims to Celestial Bodies, in A SYMPosIUM, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SPACE
EXPLORATION, S. Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 626-36(h) (1961) [hereinafter cited as
SYMPOSIUM].
"°See generally I HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393-408 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as HACKWORTH]; Von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness
in International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 448 (1935); Simsarian, The Acquisition of Legal Title
to Terra Nullius, 53 POL. ScI. Q. 111 (1938); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 506 (1955);
1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY As APPLIED AND INTERPRETED BY THE UNITED STATES
162 (2d rev. ed. 1947); LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRI-
TORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-59 (1926); JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-36 (1963); Finch, supra note 19.
21 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 46 (1933).
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Moon and planets? Mere discovery in the sense of visual apprehension of
land has long since been discarded, if it ever existed, as a basis of legal
claim to new territory. The same is true for disembarkation or extended
exploration of specific areas without more.2 The next step in establishing
a claim is symbolic annexation. This involves formal taking of possession
under authority of the sovereign by means of a ceremony on the new
territory. This once gave either immediate right of ownership to the claimed
territory" or only created an inchoate title which could mature into
sovereignty provided reasonably prompt, effective occupation followed.'
It is certain that today the principle of effective occupation is now firmly
established as the only means of acquiring lands open to acquisition."
The principle of effective occupation, however, is an elastic concept
which depends on variable factors. These factors are: the size and con-
figuration of the territory; whether the territory is inhabited or not; and
the presence or absence of competing claims to the same territory by
other nations. The content of effective occupation has changed even in
relatively recent times from that of colonization and settlement" to that of
a political character-the continuous and peaceful display of state
authority.
27
In the eyes of an international tribunal, there is no fixed yardstick,
which, placed against all factual situations, answers with certainty the
question of the degree of state activity required to give juridical credence
to a claim of ownership of a portion of the Moon." The few judgments by
international tribunals do, however, constitute a series of legal measuring
rods of various sizes which may be placed against different fact situations.
In the case of a single, unpopulated island a few miles wide, effective
occupation may be equivalent to a single act amounting to symbolic
annexation, such as a shipboard proclamation followed by a single crew
landing.29 It may also consist of remote political control through native
princes.'
In the case of large areas in temperate or tropical zones, suitable for
habitation, a stricter rule prevails. There some colonization, or the exer-
cise of political control and administrative overlordship through delegated
22 KELLER, LISSITZYN & MANN, CREATION OF RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYMBOLIC
ACTS 1400-1800, 148 (1938).
2 Ibid.; accord, Simsarian, supra note 20, at 127.
241 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 166; McDOUGAL 833.
2Island of Palmas Arbitration, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829-72 (1928), reprinted in
22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867-912 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Palmas Arbitration]; Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., ser. A/13, No. 53, at 46 (1933).
26 1 HACEWORTH 399 (quoting letter of Secretary of State Hughes to A. W. Prescott, 13 May
1924).
271 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 20, at 509-10; Palmas Arbitration.
2 As stated by Judge Huber, "Manifestations of sovereignty assume, it is true, different forms,
according to conditions of time and place." Palmas Arbitration 877.
" Clipperton Island Arbitration, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1107-11 (1931), reprinted in
26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Clipperton Island Arbitration].
"gPalmas Arbitration. Such cases are discussed in Von der Heydte, supra note 20, at 462-63,
465; SVARLIEN, THE EAST GREENLAND CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 58 (U. of Fla. Mono-
graph 1964); Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735-53 (1928); Mc-
DOUGAL 840-44, 864; Finch, supra note 19; Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law,
27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 332, 342, 348 (1950); JENNINGS, OP. cit. supra note 20, at 22-23.
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agents, and the use and enjoyment of the resources of the territory would
be required to tip the legal scales.3'
The application of rules regarding occupation to land masses far re-
moved from civilization is more in point when considering the occupation
of planets. Though nations have dealt with, and made claim to, isolated
and uninhabitable terrain, as in the case of Spitsbergen,"a the Falkland
Islands,3 and both north and south polar regions," only one adjudicated
case has dealt extensively with a large land area in an inaccessible and
desolate situation comparable to that which may be found on the Moon
and Mars. This is, of course, the East Greenland Case' which disposed of
840,000 square miles of ice plateau bordered by a narrow habitable coastal
strip. In this case involving Norway and Denmark, Denmark was able
to show three discrete, intermittent occasions from 1261 to 1931 in which
she exercised certain political rights over one or more colonies, which
rights were intended by her to cover the entire island. These regulations
and decrees dealt with crimes, monopoly trading powers, restrictions on the
trading of other nations, certain police powers, decrees providing for the
administrative interconnection of all Greenland, restriction of navigation,
hunting and fishing regulations, scientific expeditions, a tour of inspection
by a government vessel, and issuance of visitation permits to the island.
The Court took into account the arctic and inaccessible character of
the uncolonized parts of the country in holding that Denmark's acts
amounted to sovereignty. It was stated that two elements are involved in
a claim based on display of authority: (1) the intention and will to act
as sovereign, and (2) some actual exercise or display of such authority.'
The Court then noted:
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial
sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribu.rnal has been
satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights,
provided that the other state could not make out a superior claim. This is
paricularly true in the case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly
populated or unsettled countries."
Applying the East Greenland Case to prospective lunar or Martian
claims, several factors stand out sharply:
First, there must be considerable state activity, physically as well as
a See account of the arbitration between Great Britain and Venezuela as to the boundary line
of British Guiana in LINDLEY, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 152-57; Von der Heydte, supra note 20,
at 465-71; 1 HACKWORTH 395-98; 1 OPPENHEIM, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 506-14; and SVAR-
LIEN, Op. cit. supra note 30, at 53-61.
" JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE 34-39 (1959).
'3 Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, BRIT. YB. INT'L L.
311-53 (1948).
4 JESSUP d TAUBENFELD, Op. cit. supra note 32, at 135-90; 1 HACKWORTH 447-66; HANES-
SIAN, 2 POLAR AREA SERIES pts. 4-7; Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 138 (1960); Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1960);
Svarlien, The Sector Principle in Law and Practice, Polar Record, Sept. 1960, p. 248; PROCEEDINGS,
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135-74 (1958); and SMEDAL, ACQUISITION OF SOV-
EREIGNTY OVER POLAR AREAS (1931).
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politically, in the form of exploration, settlement, and laws purporting to
deal with the territory as a whole. Though it has been said that very little
more than the mere will to extend sovereignty is the lesson of Greenland"8
and that effective occupation is reduced in the case of wasteland to an
ill-defined minimum,3 a claim to territory on celestial bodies must be
based on more than fragmentary activities coupled with grandiose declara-
tions. Actual display, but not necessarily a special administration, is still
required. One or more permanent lunar or Martian installations, inter-
mittently occupied by persons under the jurisdiction of the claiming
nation, would be required for a claim of sovereignty over some portion
of the surface for which regulations covering political and economic mat-
ters have been publicly proclaimed.'
Second, a large land mass that is a geographical unit, an organic whole,
or a large, naturally rounded off region may be claimed in entirety on the
basis of only one or more such installations effectively occupied as above41
provided the area is also uninhabited. This might apply to the craters and
to the plains or maria, the largest of which is Mare Imbrium, 540 miles in
diameter.
Third, related to the above, and irrespective of whether or not an organic
whole is involved, a minimum effective occupation would carry with it an
ample amount of territory. Effective occupation does not "imply its exten-
sion to every nook and corner."' The extent of territory taken into con-
trol would be based on a rule of reasonableness. Mere contiguity, except
where the geographical configuration is an entity, is not acceptable.' A
balance would have to be struck between the principle of susceptibility to
control which, in the case of the Moon, would tend to contract the area
claimed" and uninhabitability, which tends to permit expansion of the
radius of ownership.
With Palmas and East Greenland in mind, one might say that sharp
physical demarcations, such as crater rims and mountain ranges, would
be appropriate boundaries' but that if in any case initially involving areas
with no conventional boundaries a radius of 25-50 miles represented the
practical limit of a nation's explorative capacity, the control would termi-
nate at that limit. In later eras, with greater control of landing modules
and tractors, the diameter of possible sovereignty would grow to larger
distances, but in no event exceeding the Moon's largest feature, 540 miles.
38 Ross, INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (1947).
39SVARLIEN, Op. cit. supra note 30, at 68.
"o But one writer, indicating that the doctrine of effectiveness is declining both in doctrine and
practice, suggests that improved telecommunications, which permit an unmanned vehicle to per-
form acts previously entrusted to humans, might result in a claim based on the acts of unmanned
ships. Verplaetz, Can Individual Nations Obtain Sovereignty Over Celestial Bodies, in FOURTH
COLLOQUIUM 311, 314, 320 (1961).
41 1 HACKWORTH 404 (quoting award as to 'organic whole" in British Guiana-Brazil boundary
dispute of 1904, citing 99 Brit. & For. S. Papers, 1905-1906); Ross, op. cit. supra note 38.
" Von der Heydte, supra note 20, at 465.
13 SVARLIEN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 59-61; 1 OPPENHEIM, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 511-12.
"Clipperton Island Arbitration. Accord, Schachter, supra note 1; Von der Heydte, supra
note 20, at 463.
' Fasan, The Legal Nature of Celestial Bodies, in FOURTH COLLOQUIUM 286 (1961).
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Fourth, the presence or absence of competing activities and claims will
constrict the maturation of the claims of one nation as against the claims
of others. In Palmas, there was no contestation, protest, or display of
sovereignty by Spain such as "might counterbalance or annihilate" the
Netherlands' sovereignty," and, once Danish acts were proved, the entire
East Greenland Case rested on the two pillars of "the absence of any
claims to sovereignty by another power, and the arctic and inaccessible
character of the uncolonized parts of the country."" In previous territorial
controversies featuring heated competing claims, such as the Oregon Con-
troversy"' and the British Guiana-Venezuela Case," the outcome tended
to equitable division of the spoils. Thus, since the essence of present plane-
tary conquest is competition between the United States and Russia, the
activities of the two nations, in the same general vicinity, will have a
geographically limiting effect on the legal aspirations of each other.
Therefore, from the standpoint of positive law, the nations which meet
the foregoing standards may validly claim portions of the Moon and Mars.
These norms, however, "are not of a character eternal and unchangeable""
and may be expanded by legal mutation over a period of time. An attempt
has already been made to claim large segments of the Antarctic and Arctic
areas by application of various "sector" principles, but the sector principle
is not generally accepted as a basis of claim to ownership at this time.'
B. Control Of Planetary Resources
From a territorial viewpoint the legal bonds are somewhat looser with
respect to the legal ownership of resources in space or on planetary bodies,
as distinguished from the ownership and control of their surfaces. There
is no legal problem with the essentially shareable resources such as cosmic
rays, electromagnetic radiation, interstellar gas, solar wind, and manifesta-
tions of gravity. One may also suppose that micrometeoroids in space,
usually no bigger than a grain of sand, are subject to appropriation by the
finder, as they have always been after falling to earth. 3 With respect to
objects found on celestial bodies or minerals extracted therefrom, the title
would likewise seem to follow the finder. This result would be clear in
the case where ownership of the area in which the extracted material was
located had been established by the finder. Even if this ownership had not
been fixed, the situation is much the same as if such products were taken
from res nullius areas on earth, as gold was taken from the New World
by Spain. No rule of international law prevents their acquisition. Other
analogies: resources taken from polar regions not admitted to be owned by
particular nations, sedentary fisheries, and oyster beds in the sea.
Where the use of a resource such as the Van Allen belt, or the possibility
4 Palmas Arbitration 909.
" Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 50 (1933).
48LINDLEY, OP. cit. supra note 20, at 132-35.
4
9Id. at 152-56.
' Svarlien, supra note 34, at 248.
51 id. at 256, 260.
12 McDOUGAL 750-55; Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, in SyMposiuM 42.
5 Fasan, Law and Peace for Celestial Bodies, in FIFTH COLLOQUIUM 8 (1962).
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of contamination of earth by transported substances, or the use of ma-
terial that might cause cyclical changes in the ecology of a planet poses a
danger or disadvantage to others, self-survival and self-protection would
dictate that such use be a delict." But in the absence of international
agreement, nothing legally prevents appropriation of a rare substance, like
the permafrost of Mars, to the exclusion of others, where no person or
property is endangered by such appropriation.55
Some difficulty may be encountered as one moves toward objects of
larger sizes. Is a medium sized asteroid a celestial body or a floating mineral
resource? No legal impediment would seem to stand in the way of appro-
priating the entirety of an asteroid, though for policy reasons a state may
deem this inadvisable. The criterion of moveability has been suggested.
Under this view no object could be used in toto if it could not be directed
and transported through space.' Again, no use would be legally permissible
that might affect the orbit of the earth, directly or indirectly disarrange
the celestial mechanics of the solar system, or in any way cause injury to
person or property.!'
Further inquiry as to sovereignty of portions of the sun, other stars, or
galaxies would be sheer speculation. One writer has denied the possibility
of sovereignty over the sun from considerations of natural law as well
as from the alleged impossibility of man to exercise control over it."
If sovereignty over portions of celestial bodies is sanctioned by present
law, any lesser form of control is legally permissible. It is predicted for
the near future that underground lunar installations with closed ecological
systems and propellant manufacturing facilities will convert the Moon
into a staging place for travel in the solar system." The Space Science
Board of the National Academy of Science has recommended lunar base
construction as a subsidiary program. The International Academy of
Astronautics has already set up a nongovernmental committee to study the
technical problems of a research laboratory on the Moon.' Any form of
installation occupies dimension and implies the commandeering of an ex-
clusive portion of planetary surface. Doubtless the example of the Ant-
arctic, with wireless stations and post offices, will be duplicated on the
Moon but in the form of radar sets, telescopes, and thermocouples. These
installations will be manned by subjects of the exploring state under the
14See U.N. Doc. No. A/5785, Annex III (1964) for a general discussion by the Committee
on Space Research (COSPAR) with suggested standards to minimize contamination.
asFor the example of the whale on earth, see Science, 27 Aug. 1965, p. 943.
56Fasan, supra note 53, at 9. Along these lines, Working Group III of the International In-
stitute of Space Law offered the definition that "Celestial bodies . . . are natural objects in Outer
Space including their eventual gaseous corona which cannot be artificially moved from their
natural orbits." Smirnoff, Fourth Report of the Working Group III of the International Institute
of Space Law, in SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM 352 (1964). Objection was immediately voiced that
eventually it was indeed planned to divert planets by artificial means into new orbits more con-
ducive to the support of life. Id. at 356.
" Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905
(1941). See U.N. GEN. Ass. REs. 1962 (XVIII) for optional consultation in the case of poten-
tially harmful interference of other states in the use of outer space.
5 Fasan, supra note 45, at 282.
8S LEVITT & COLE, EXPLORING THE SECRETS OF SPACE 58-67, 267 (1963).
"
5 Haley, Legal Problems of Manned Lunar Lab, in SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM 62 (1964).
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direction of particular governments, so that they will be legally under
de facto national control. All the foregoing finds no obstacle in existing
international law.
If the current Geneva talks or any future international conference pro-
duce a treaty for celestial bodies, the treaty provisions would supplant
customary law. They would replace it, however, only to the extent of
specific agreements reached and only with respect to the parties to the
treaty. A treaty ban on "national appropriation" which permitted de
facto acquisitions and uses on the Moon would amount in the end only to
an agreement to exercise sovereignty without terming it sovereignty.
III. TELEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Are the above solutions what we really want? Is the concept of pri-
mary national rights not a declension from the rejection of national
sovereignty advocated by the United Nations? The answer to this poses
a discussion of what the law should be with respect to ownership, control,
and supervision of celestial bodies, and calls into play subjective value
considerations. But it also demands a pragmatic determination of what
objects and means will be beneficial, and to whom, in the conquest of
space.
One may say that the overriding objective should be the maintenance
of maximum international concord and the greatest material progress,
consistent with national interest. But what is the national interest? With-
out minimizing the grave responsibilities of national leaders in matters of
military security, there is a long range national interest of the people of
the United States as opposed to a short range interest. If it were possible
to judge all the consequences of acts of State or to be able to see beyond
the bend of time, then it would be easy to choose alternatives. Then short
range interests and long range interests would merge and be identical.
It may indeed appear to both Russia and the United States that not
only the control of space is militarily and physically vital to each, but
that the seizure of as much planetary terrain as possible is indispensable
politically and economically. But this may be only the appearance of
things, not the reality. It is not certain that more may not be lost than
gained in moving observation posts beyond a few earth radii,' or even
that control of space is possible. From purely a national standpoint, the
United States must remain strong not only in actuality but in the world's
image."6 It probably is true also that until the Moon race is finished-since
it is a race-the United States must aim at space primacy. This is not said
in an absolutist sense; if it were, there would be no point in foregoing the
testing of nuclear weapons.
But this does not mean that it must be the ultimate national object of
61 Ramo, Choosing Our Space Goals, in SPACE WEAPONS, A HANDBOOK OF MILITARY ASTRO-
NAUTICS 159 (1959).
62 GIBNEY & FELDMAN, THE RELUCTANT SPACE FARERS 49-64 (1965); Schelling, The Threat
of Violence in International Affairs, PROCEDINcS, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
104 (1963).
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the United States or of any country to carve up for itself as much lunar
or Martian terrain as possible. There is no empirical connection between
property rights on celestial bodies and national invulnerability. As for
future centuries, in which it is supposed that population pressures will
force people to the planets"' or underwater, the present bi-polarity or
multi-polarity of power is likely to give way to new international con-
formations.
Even if the foregoing were not true, the utility of national structuring
of space must come into question on other expedient grounds. It is true
that the modern state at the center of Western civilization, joining itself
to science and technology, is responsible for much of the progress and
well-being of people, at least in the advanced nations. To cast a balance
between the benefits conferred and the damage wrought by unchecked
nationalism is beyond the scope of this note. Four empires, each devoted
to its own interest: British, Japanese, German, and Italian, were cast up
and then abandoned in the last hundred years alone. Who can foretell
where the process will end?
It is plain fact that national rivalries have led to war in the past, irre-
spective of the moral blame of particular nations. World War II accounted
for over twenty million direct fatalities in addition to those wounded,
the depleted resources, and a financial cost estimated at one trillion dollars. 4
If the price of the dead alone, one out of every one hundred and ten of
all the world's people, is not considered excessive when weighed against
presumed advantages in material progress, it is generally agreed that the
toll of future atomic war will be prohibitive."5
In connection with the question of national rivalries, one is surprised
to hear it announced that peace and international stability must rest on
a balance of power, as if a new discovery had been made that guaranteed
permanent peace." It is as if past collapses of balances of power had never
taken place. As if the company of nations were a series of mathematical
abstractions that responded to mechanistic rules of order. Unfortunately,
nations respond to their own interests, rationally or irrationally, and not
to general conceptions. There can never be any permanent equilibrium of
dynamic opposing national forces. One must always expect that one na-
tion will go too far, dragging the entire fabric of alliances and counter-
alliances into general collapse and total war.
Further, the standard of living in the United States is doubled with
every generation, 7 but the gap between Western societies and almost all
others has widened." This poses the necessity of economic and political
63 N.Y. Times, 22 May 1966, p. 85, col. 5, quoting Prof. E. Kolman of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences that "escape into cosmic space . . . will become inevitable."
64 25 FUNK & WAGNALL'S STANDARD REFERENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA 9360-61 (1961).
65 Morganthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century, in 3 THE RESTORATION OF AMERICAN POLI-
TICS 162 (1962).
'Halle, Our War Aims Were Wrong, N.Y. Times, 22 Aug. 1965, § 6 (Magazine), p. 13.
:7 WALLICH, THE COST OF FREEDOM 10 (1960).
' Maxwell, Maldistribution of Property, World Justice, March 1965, p. 317; see also Address
by Vice-President Humphrey, Fordham University Commencement, 9 June 1965, reprinted in 53
DEP'T STATE BULL. 56 (1965).
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integration, of which space may be a part. Thus, against a natural desire
to secure national preeminence on the planets, one must counterpoise the
pragmatic benefits of an international solution.
Against a possible deceleration of scientific progress in the event the
space race were slowed, 9 it should be pointed out that an effective world
space structure might lay plans for broadgaged, directed progress with the
participation of many nations in the exploration of the solar system.
There would still be full scope for competition by national components in
subsidiary space tasks, such as rocket building and new power sources, as
well as in other realms, such as physics, chemistry, medicine, and atomic
energy. The case for international tension as the chief technological stim-
ulant is not proved, in view of the fact that the world made its sharpest
industrial progress from 1815 to 1914, a period of relative peace.
Against the speculation that far-reaching economic benefits to the
United States or Russia justifies national spheres of interest on celestial
bodies, the possibility of sharing the economic space burdens and benefits
should be seriously explored. A manned expedition to Mars will cost $100
billion."0 Investors should be welcomed. There is little danger that the
advanced nations will lose scientific preeminence, and the prospect is that a
small rise in the standard of living of underdeveloped nations would
create new markets for the developed nations.
International solutions have been advocated by many commentators,
ranging from national colonies under the supervision of the United Na-
tions"' to direct space administration through a Cosmic Development
Corporation attached to the United Nations." Dr. Schachter, with rare
foresight, perceived very early that the doctrine of effective occupation,
like that of discovery, was outmoded in juristic terms and social applica-
bility. He proposed a system of United Nations licensing and regulation
of resources, somewhat limited to states with necessary technical ability."
Dr. Jenks added the refinement of title to be vested in the United Nations,
and exploitation to be carried on under a licensing arrangement."' The
David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies put together a
very comprehensive draft code which permits nations to establish stations
and retain jurisdiction of them under the supervision of the United Na-
tions. Military bases, but not military activity, would appear to be banned
as well as nuclear testing. The Draft Code, unfortunately, appears to pre-
serve almost full freedom of national action and disposition of any re-
sources."' A working group of the International Institute of Space Law
under the chairmanship of Dr. Michael Smirnoff of Yugoslavia"0 has
09 Taubenfeld, Status of Competing Claims, PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 185 (1963).
70 GIBNEY & FELDMAN, Op. cit. supra note 62, at 143.
71 Menter, Jurisdiction over Land Masses in Space, in FOURTH COLLOQUIUM 61 (1961).
72 JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, Op. cit. supra note 32, at 281-82.
71 Schachter, supra note 1.
4 Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, in SYMPOSIUM 33.
7' 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 141 (1963).
70 Dr. Smirnoff has brilliantly collected the work of others in The Legal Status of Celestial
Bodies, 28 J. AIR L. & CoM. 385 (1961-1962).
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formulated a preliminary draft resolution which, though denying national
or private appropriation of portions of celestial bodies, permits states un-
trammelled use of same."
It would seem possible to take a further step forward, vesting all title
to celestial bodies and products from celestial bodies in the United Nations
or some such corporation as suggested by Jessup and Taubenfeld, which
would retain full jurisdiction of all installations and activities but permit
administration by the nation or organization establishing the station. The
corporation would itself be encouraged to establish planetary stations, and
multi-national installations would likewise be promoted. In this respect,
the suggestion of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
that the nations adopt any further decision as to celestial bodies that may
be agreed to by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly,"8 is a step in
the right direction. It might be more useful, however, to insert a decision-
making formula in treaty form, according to a weighted vote structure
that would protect the interests of the large space powers.
Under this arrangement, the world community would make the decisions
as to the disposition of any proceeds of exploration and to the use of
celestial terrain, and would finance its own operations. States would not
be prohibited from space exploration or the establishment of stations, but
would have to turn them over to the United Nations.
Such an arrangement would not work to the disadvantage of any nation
because the staggering cost of space exploration would be shared by many
nations. At the same time, the principle expressed by Dr. Cocca of Argen-
tina9 that the benefits of space activity "belong ab initio to humanity"
with due and profitable compensation to the agent who does the material
work and that celestial products should serve the benefit of all states,
irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development, is
consistent with the repeated declarations of national leaders. The Agree-
ments establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Com-
munications Satellite System is an example of a device that permits multi-
national operation of a scientific enterprise at the same time that it pro-
vides weighted voting in accordance with state contributions." Not sur-
prisingly, overall control of such an international corporation should be
placed in the United Nations, which would also provide the major share of
funds. In 1948 the United States itself suggested a multiple condominium
for the Antarctic continent,"1 and in 1956 the Prime Minister of New
Zealand proposed a United Nations trusteeship over the area and its
establishment as "World Territory." 2 Though these suggestions were
shelved in favor of the preservation of the status quo, it is a source of
" Smirnoff, Fourth Report of the Working Group III of the International Institute of Space
Law, in SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM 351-54 (1964).
78Reprinted in JENKS, SPACE LAW 445 (1965).
78 Cocca, General Principles for the Utilization of Outer Space, in SIXTH COLLOQUIUM (1963);
Cocca, Legal Status of Celestial Bodies and Economic Status of the Celestial Products, in SEVENTH
COLLOQUIUM 15 (1964).
"Communications Satellite System (COMSAT), 20 Aug. 1964, T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
81 Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, supra note 34, at 438.
"Id. at 450.
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regret that the opportunity was missed to set an international precedent
for space exploration at the time it would have been most timely.
The mechanics for various degrees of international arrangements have
been set forth exhaustively by Jessup and Taubenfeld" They warn that
history demonstrates the unworkability of division of governmental re-
sponsibilities and powers between States and international organizations.
For this reason, full control should be given to the United Nations.
Since only three years may pass before the first manned lunar landing,
it is suggested that a first step be taken now in the form of an agreement
among space powers to permit a United Nations observer in any future
manned orbital laboratory. A second step would be the formation by
such international scientific organizations as the International Astronautical
Federation, the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), and the In-
ternational Academy of Astronautics of space academies in various coun-
tries to train astronaut-administrators for space duties. A third step would
be to embody the above principles in an international convention which
would provide for an international organization having full jurisdiction
over all activities on celestial bodies.
The chief difficulty may be in persuading Russia to participate in these
ventures. Russian commentators have been silent on the question of con-
trol of celestial areas. Their comments, sketchy thus far, indicate that they
favor reservation of national control of installations." One feels that this
silence must be broken.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the legal analysis of the first part of this note has
demonstrated how, in the words of Dr. Jessup, sovereignty is "the quick-
sand upon which the foundations of traditional law are built." The substi-
tution of a "Space Discovery" program" that would channel human enter-
prise into productive areas and absorb immense defense establishments
would be the start of an international structure that would help all peoples
without hurting any nation.
SaJEssup & TAUBENFELD, Op. cit. supra note 32, at 275-82.
"Smirnoff, supra note 76, at 395-96; Crane, Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law,
56 AM. J. INT'L L. 685, 700-06 (1962).
5 GiBNEY & FELDMAN, Op. cit. supra note 62, at 150-74.
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